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Both Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, and New York City have experi-
enced catastrophic weather events in recent years. In January 2011, the 
Brisbane River flooded, inundating more than 20,000 houses; in October 
2012, superstorm Hurricane Sandy hit New York City and produced a 
major storm surge that flooded much of the city. Ferry systems in both 
cities were badly affected. Comparative research was used to explore how 
each city’s ferry operators and managers addressed the impacts before, 
during, and after those events. A review of published materials related 
to the two systems during and after the disasters was supplemented by 
interviews with key agency personnel in each city, conducted in mid-2013. 
Results suggest that how ferries are affected by floods and other disasters 
and how ferries may be used to rapidly respond to and provide for post-
flood transport needs depend entirely on context. The linear river ferry 
operations of Brisbane suffered much terminal damage, and operations 
were unable to recommence service as a result of debris and the swollen 
nature of the river for many weeks after the flood. In contrast, within 
2 days, New York City ferries were reintroduced on key routes and were 
introduced to new emergency locations to provide mobility for citizens 
who were unable to use other transport modes because of storm damage. 
The lessons learned by the operators include essential areas that authori-
ties must address before a disaster: infrastructure design and resilience, 
disaster planning, insurance and legal requirements, staff management, 
and coordination during the reconstruction phase. Findings suggest that 
authorities can significantly reduce damage and improve recovery times 
if they plan and prepare for such events well ahead of time.
A January 2011 flood devastated the city of Brisbane, Queensland, 
Australia; the CityCat ferry system was out of operation for more 
than 4 weeks. New York City was ravaged by Hurricane Sandy in 
October 2012, but its East River Ferry service was running again 
2 days after the storm surge and delivering vital transport capacity 
when key subway and road links were inoperable or faced severe 
difficulties. The aim of this paper is to document the experiences 
of ferry operators during and after these two major weather events, 
determine why the outcomes were so different in Brisbane and New 
York City, and learn lessons from operators and managers for the 
benefit of the wider ferry community.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, the published 
research on ferries in disasters is summarized and highlights pre­
paredness and response issues. Then, the two analyzed ferry systems 
are introduced, and the study approach and methods are described. 
Results of interviews and reviews of the ferries before, during, and 
after the studied weather events are provided. Finally, key lessons 
learned from the study, implications for planning and policy, and 
avenues for additional inquiry are summarized.
Background
Ferries can be central to, affected by, or useful in major emergencies. 
Ferry disasters still occur, particularly in developing countries, even 
though ferries are the safest form of transport in North America and 
Europe (1). River ferry systems feature little infrastructure beyond 
their terminals, which can be dramatically affected by major flood 
events. Similarly, marine terminals for sea ferries can be destroyed in 
hurricanes and tsunamis. For example, in Aceh, Indonesia, the Box­
ing Day tsunami in December 2004 killed more than 100,000 people 
and destroyed ports and ferry terminals up and down the west coast 
of Indonesia, primarily on the island of Sumatra; nevertheless, ferries 
were integral in resupplying transport and goods to those locations hit 
by the tsunami (2). Ferries and small boats also played significant roles 
in response to other disasters: the evacuation of lower Manhattan, New 
York, on September 11, 2001 (3); the landing of U.S. Airways Flight 
1549 in the Hudson River in New York in January 2009 (4); the New 
York City blackout of 2003 (5); and bushfires in southern Tasmania, 
Australia, in January 2013 (6).
Even so, the role of ferries for community emergency management 
in general and assisting affected communities in particular is not well 
described in the literature. The Guidelines for Ferry Transportation 
Services only vaguely describe emergency response involving ferries 
for the U.S. Virgin Islands, Hawaii, and similar sites and suggests that 
ferry operators should comply and participate “in emergency disas­
ter relief plans and drills, wherever appropriate” (7, p. 104). More 
detailed outlines of the roles of ferries in disaster recovery include the 
work of the Bay Area Council of San Francisco, California (8), which 
recommends designating a waterborne emergency response fleet in 
advance of any major earthquake that would disrupt road and rail 
transport significantly, as well as reviews of Hurricane Sandy (9, 10), 
which describe the extensive emergency and nonemergency ferry ser­
vice provision that made a major contribution to the city, especially 
when key road and subway links were cut.
The literature on transportation resilience and response to natural 
disasters is more advanced. Freckleton et al. suggest evaluation and 
preparedness frameworks for the resilience of transport networks 
(11). Croope and McNeil present similar research in the postdisaster 
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context (12). Mongioi et al. researched the roles of planning organiza­
tions and travel demand management managers in assisting with post­
disaster transport planning and operations (13). Transport operators 
and managers must both plan for and prepare assets and operations 
for possible emergencies. Operators and managers should participate 
in incident action planning, designate resources for particular tasks in 
advance, and ensure that they are part of regional incident manage­
ment systems (14). Ferries may play a specific role in evacuations, 
logistics (e.g., transporting specialists to a scene, supplying goods to 
isolated locations), and postdisaster public transport operations when 
road and rail systems are down. Regulatory frameworks may limit or 
discourage ferry response to emergencies. Incident managers and key 
authorities can assist by exempting ferry operators from some usual 
safety regulations to encourage operators to help how they can, as 
the U.S. Coast Guard did on September 11, 2001 (15). By preparing 
more resilient systems that can assist with recovery, ferry operators 
may “reduce the probability of failure within the system and reduce 
the consequences of any failure that occurs, thus improving recovery 
time” (11, p. 2).
Diverse cities worldwide—including Copenhagen, Denmark; 
Gothenburg, Sweden; London; Brisbane; Sydney, New South Wales, 
Australia; New York City; and Bangkok, Thailand—now operate lin­
ear river ferries. Therefore, planners must consider how these systems 
can (a) better withstand flood and storm surge disasters to which they 
are vulnerable and (b) best be used to assist with essential transport 
needs in the immediate recovery phase after a disaster. Kendra et al. 
note the importance of considering the unexpected problems that occur 
for transport providers (in this case, river ferries) during disasters, 
the organizational response and nontraditional resources that might 
be needed, the preplanning steps required, and the best crisis manage­
ment procedures (3). The recent trials of these two cities, Brisbane and 
New York City, offer an opportunity to explore such questions.
BrisBanE and nEw York citY  
FErrY sYstEms
The two cities examined in this study—Brisbane and New York 
City—are very different. Australia’s third­largest city by population, 
Brisbane is home to slightly more than 2 million residents; in con­
trast, Greater New York City boasts almost 20 million residents, 
making it the most populous city in the United States. Both cities 
feature a linear river ferry system. The routes and terminals for Bris­
bane CityCat services and the East River Ferry in New York City are 
provided in Figure 1 at the same scale. Of course, other ferries oper­
ate in both cities, particularly in New York City. But these two linear 
systems are the focus of this study because they are similar in size, 
vessel type, terminal type, and operations. However, their experi­
ences after weather disasters in 2011 and 2012 (flood and hurricane, 
respectively) were very different. A direct comparison of these sys­
tems allows a useful examination of how managers and operators 
planned for, reacted to, and learned from the emergency events, as 
well as a look at the contexts that helped shape outcomes in each city.
Because Sipe and Burke (16) and Camay et al. (17) describe these 
two ferry systems at length, only a summary is provided here. Both 
systems operate 7 days a week, all year. The vessels differ slightly 
(Brisbane runs catamarans, and New York City runs a single­hull 
fleet); however, both the first­generation CityCats and the East 
River Ferry vessels accommodate a maximum of 149 passengers 
during the week. (The New York ferry runs 399­passenger double­
deck vessels on weekends.) Both systems feature open­air stand­
ing and seating areas on board. CityCat offers more terminals and 
shorter average stop spacing than does the East River Ferry, but both 
use so­called spud barges (pontoons with long posts on each of the 
four corners that allow floating up and down, but not sideways) with 
attached ramps as terminals. The ramps, access ways, and vessels of 
(a) (b)
FIGURE 1  Routes and terminal locations of ferry systems studied, 2013: (a) Brisbane CityCat and (b) East River 
Ferry, New York City (East River Ferry also serving as eighth terminal at Governor’s Island, New York, in summer).
Burke and Sipe 129
both systems are compliant with relevant disability access legisla­
tion. CityCat offers more extensive operating hours in the morning 
and evening, especially on weekends, than the East River Ferry. Both 
systems provide a mixture of cross­river opportunities and linear 
line­haul transit on a parallel system, as defined by Thompson et al. 
(18), to serve commuters, students, tourists, and other markets, and 
are supplemented by their operators (and other operators, in New 
York City) by an additional set of cross­river ferries in and around 
the corridor. Key features of the two systems are provided in Table 1.
mEthods
A systematic desktop review was conducted of published material on 
the two ferry operations in Brisbane and New York City before, during, 
and after the flood events. The review was supplemented with materi­
als provided by and interviews conducted (in June and July 2013) with 
pivotal officers responsible for the ferry systems. Conducted by tele­
phone, the interviews followed previously supplied question scripts. 
Interviews were partially transcribed, then comments were proposed 
for use and sent to interviewees for comment and revision. Participants 
included a representative of the Brisbane local government who was 
responsible for contract management and oversight of the ferry system 
and a representative from New York City with similar responsibilities. 
Interviews focused on participant roles; institutional arrangements; 
and events leading up to, during, and after the disaster. Interviewees 
also were asked to share key lessons learned from their experiences.
BrisBanE citYcat and 2011 FLood
Brisbane flooded previously in 1893 and 1974, and a flood­retention 
dam was built at Wivenhoe to prevent another catastrophe of such 
a scale. A La Niña monsoonal trough in late 2010 brought extensive 
rainfall to the region, and December 2010 was the city’s wettest month 
on record (19). In early January 2011, dam waters eventually exceeded 
Wivenhoe’s supply capacity, and major water releases were ordered 
to protect the dam wall. Flooding began in Brisbane on January 11, 
and residents on 2,100 streets were evacuated before the 4.46­m peak 
on January 13 (20). Some 20,000 houses were inundated, and much 
of the built infrastructure along the river was destroyed.
Limited advance warning of the likelihood of flooding was avail­
able before the event, as dam operators commenced fast water release. 
This release dramatically swelled the Brisbane River, increased its 
flow rate, and added significant debris. The ferry operator, TransDev, 
became increasingly concerned about the debris. The 25­knot 
CityCats experienced some problems with the increased flow rate, 
but the 10­knot cross­river ferries were unable to operate safely. On 
January 9, as the threat of a major flood became imminent, TransDev 
ceased all ferry operations and immediately prepared to secure the 
system’s assets.
The terminals were decommissioned and prepared for flooding 
as best they could. In hindsight (remembering that before the event, 
the dam was widely believed to prevent such floods from occur­
ring), the design of most terminals was insufficient to withstand the 
coming flood. Electricians were sent out to disconnect electricity, 
and everything that could be moved to higher ground was moved. 
The fleet was moved to a sheltered harbor in Moreton Bay. Even 
though that bay can be relatively placid, the vessels were not rated 
or approved for use in open water, and the Brisbane City Council’s 
insurance did not cover the vessels outside the safety of the river 
mouth. However, the river was about to be unsafe. The state govern­
ment regulator, Maritime Safety Queensland, swiftly granted approv­
als, and the council’s treasury section granted insurance in time for 
the fleet to be moved to the bay. This decision proved successful: 
of the 19 CityCats and nine cross­river ferries, only one vessel sus­
tained minor damage from floating debris; the rest were unscathed. 
The same could not be said for the terminals. Television footage 
showed terminals and other infrastructure being battered by debris 
or washing away. Ramps were not designed to hinge and swing with 
the torrent, and the pontoons were not streamlined. Landing areas 
were immersed, and ticket machines and other infrastructure were 
destroyed. Of the 24 terminals in the system, seven incurred major 
damage, seven incurred moderate damage (four at the more serious 
end of the scale), and the rest incurred only minor damage (20).
As the waters receded, damage inspections began. Divers inspected 
the piles, many of which had moved. Temporary terminals were 
installed at key sites to allow operations to recommence before later 
TABLE 1  Features of CityCat and East River Ferry Systems
Characteristic Brisbane CityCat East River Ferry
Year introduced 1996 2011
Management 
 
Terminals owned by Brisbane City Council; ferries managed 
under contract by TransDev 
Terminals owned by New York City or private 
interests; ferries managed under contract by 
BillyBey Ferry Company
Number of ferries in fleet 19 Minimum of four in service during weekdays
Maximum cruising speed in operation 25 knots 28 knots
Ferry capacity 149 or 162 passengers 149 passengers
Number of terminals 16 7 (8 in summer)
Average daily passengers ∼11,500 (2010–11) 2,862 (2011)





Integrated ticketing; fares integrated to same zonal structure 
and price as broader Brisbane (Translink) public transport 
fares; one­way cross­river adult fare US$2.96, full route 
one­way fare US$4.12; no monthly passes; multiple 
concessions provided
Separate ticketing; one­way adult ticket  
(any length) US$4, monthly pass US$140; 
limited concessions provided 
 
Source: TransDev, Brisbane City Council, Translink.com.au, New York City Economic Development Corporation, and www.eastriverferry.com
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reconstruction of more flood­resilient infrastructure. Travel demand 
management teams deployed alternative transport plans; buses were 
introduced to service ferry stops where other public transport options 
were not available. Ferry staff were deployed both in cleanup opera­
tions and in customer service, to help passengers access alternative 
transport. Ferry operations recommenced on February 15, 2013, on 15 
of the 24 terminals in the ferry network. By March, some 21 terminals 
were back online, and by April, all but one were in service. The West 
End terminal, a key node in the CityCat system, was not back online 
until August 2013, after a previously planned major upgrade was 
completed; that terminal now can accommodate dual berthing (two 
vessels berthed immediately adjacent to the pontoon simultaneously). 
A first­generation terminal with spud barge at Gardens Point and the 
new flood­resilient design at Hamilton North Shore are pictured in 
Figure 2.
The new permanent terminals are being designed to be resilient to 
a 1­in­200­year flood. The ramps are not fully retractable but include 
fifth­wheel hinges that allow them to change angle with the flood­
waters (by offering both up–down and left–right rotation, signifi­
cantly reducing horizontal tension loading), and the pontoons have 
deflection structures at the upstream end and are more streamlined 
(20). These new designs are intended to reduce damage and cost and 
improve recovery time. Other key lessons learned from the experi­
ence include the need for better flood mapping and analysis and the 
need to plan for worst­case scenarios by learning what an operator or 
manager might need and which arrangements should be available. 
The city council has entered into specific arrangements that include 
standing offers, which allow fast­tracked appointments (e.g., of sal­
vage teams, divers, and other skilled personnel as a priority and ahead 
of others) should a similar event occur in the future. Also under con­
sideration are ways to minimize staff fatigue during a weather event 
or other crisis. For example, team members should become mini­
mally proficient at tasks associated with other job titles to create skill 
redundancies; in this way, several staff members will be available to 
cover important positions during a crisis. The city council also has 
learned how teams across local and state governments can coordinate 
in the recovery phase. For instance, reconstruction of a ferry terminal 
may be combined with aspects of park and bikeway reconstruction at 
a location, and team approaches lead to improved outcomes.
East rivEr FErrY and hurricanE sandY
When Hurricane Sandy headed toward the U.S. Mid­Atlantic states, 
the storm already had wreaked havoc in Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic, and Cuba from October 24 to 27, 2012. This Category 3 
hurricane joined forces with another storm as it bore down on the 
metropolitan expanses of New Jersey and New York City. Residents 
in low­lying areas, including the New York Zone A coastal precincts, 
were evacuated from the expected area of storm surge and flooding as 
part of emergency planning. Hurricane Sandy landed on October 29 
and swamped much of the city, killing 43 persons in New York City 
alone (10). The East River flooded into parts of lower Manhattan and 
Brooklyn as well as seven subway tunnels (21). Blackouts resulted, 
and millions were without power.
The ferry operator, BillyBey Ferry Co., received limited warning 
of the impending event, similar to what had occurred in Brisbane the 
previous year. But the operators were helped by having had recent 
experience with Hurricane Irene (August 27 and 28, 2011) and a 
strong legacy of emergency management planning provided by the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The New York City Eco­
nomic Development Corporation, which manages, subsidizes, and 
oversees day­to­day operations of the ferry system, suspended all 
operations by October 29. Operators decommissioned the seven East 
River Ferry terminals and another 12 to 15 landings and prepared 
for the storm. Figure 3 shows a typical East River Ferry terminal 
and vessel. Great efforts were made to ensure that power was dis­
connected and ramps were detached from the pontoons and barges. 
As in Brisbane, this preparatory work required at least 1 day to com­
plete. The fleet was secured, but without the insurance issues that 
existed in Brisbane. The hurricane presented different challenges—
high winds, but not swift­flowing water—because the East River is 
more of a tidal inlet than a major water catchment. At most terminals, 
damage was modest; however, landing areas were immersed, and 
infrastructure (e.g., ticketing machines) was destroyed.
The damage to the city’s transport infrastructure became apparent as 
the storm passed. Road and rail tunnels were flooded, and the subway 
could not operate. Severe gridlock occurred at the street level, and fuel 
supplies ran critically low, but the city had secured diesel supplies for 
the ferries preemptively. Despite the devastation, some areas of the 
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 2  CityCat ferry terminals: (a) first-generation terminal 
with spud barge at Gardens Point, low tide, 1996, and (b) new 
flood-resilient design at Hamilton North Shore, high tide, 2011.
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city returned to business remarkably quickly, and the ferries played a 
major role in its recovery. Some ferries were reintroduced as early as 
October 31, then the East River Ferry on November 1 and the Staten 
Island Ferry on November 2; ferries “quickly become a popular travel 
alternative” (9, p. 8).
The East River Ferry was the first public transport mode that 
enabled East River crossings between Manhattan and Queens and 
Brooklyn, New York. After service resumed, ridership doubled, and 
a fourth ferry was added to meet demand. Critical to this effort were 
effective human resources management and proactive steps taken by 
operators to refuel the vehicles of ferry staff who were on the water. 
Given the gas crisis that engulfed the city after the hurricane, staff 
would not have been able to work without then ability to drive to 
and from work, and ferry operations would have ceased. Also help­
ful in the recommencement phase was a smartphone app recently 
launched by the BillyBey Ferry Co. that allowed direct fare payment. 
Highly popular with regular users, this fare payment app significantly 
reduced the load on staff handling the additional passengers, especially 
given the destruction of most ticket machines.
The success of the ferries during the crisis and their potential 
for rapid deployment encouraged the Economic Development Cor­
poration to introduce a new ferry from Pier 11 in lower Manhattan 
to a temporary terminal in Rockaway, New York (108th Street and 
Beach Channel Drive), on November 12, less than 2 weeks after 
the storm. The temporary terminal effectively replaced the A train, 
which was out of service for 7 months because of the severely dam­
aged Broad Channel railroad bridge and 1,000 ft of unusable track. 
The New York Department of Transportation then added ferry ser­
vice from Great Kills, Staten Island, New York, to lower Manhattan 
on November 25 (10).
In other lessons learned, operators and managers have recognized 
the need for quick­disconnect systems to cut power rapidly to the 
terminals. Other changes to terminal design include raising the spud 
heights of barges to provide more resiliency. Also, as in Brisbane, 
fifth­wheel hinges already were being installed before the hurricane to 
allow a wide range of motion that improves the resiliency of the ramps.
Crises seem to provide an ideal testing ground for potential new 
services. The Rockaway Ferry, originally intended to remain for only 
7 months, is still in operation at the time of this writing and is supposed 
to continue until at least January 2014. Given its patronage success, 
the service may continue long after that date. Launched on Novem­
ber 12, 2012, the service had carried more than 90,000 passengers as 
of mid­July 2013. Weekend service was added in May and also will 
continue. As of August 5, the Rockaway Ferry made additional stops 
at the Brooklyn Army Terminal in Sunset Park (58th Street Landing), 
which aided commuters disadvantaged by poststorm repairs on the 
R train service, which would be disrupted for 14 months. At the time 
of this writing, it is not known how long that service will operate.
kEY LEssons LEarnEd
River ferry operators learned many lessons from the experiences 
studied in this paper. Suggested terminal design modifications include 
the following:
•	 Quick­disconnect systems for electricity,
•	 Removable ticket machines, and
•	 Resilient pontoons and barges (e.g., deflection devices, stream­
lining, higher piles designed to handle vertical movement in tidal 
surges, and fifth­wheel hinges for ramps).
Suggested planning and operations steps include the following:
•	 Prepare for an emergency disaster by planning for worst­case 
scenarios, and designate resources in advance;
•	 Ensure regulator understanding and preparedness to suspend 
key regulatory framework that could limit or prevent effective 
emergency response (e.g., establish processes to determine quickly 
which vessels may receive a waiver of safety regulations and any 
insurance implications);
•	 Train operator staff in the skill sets needed to provide rapid 
response in the event of an emergency and decommission terminals;
•	 Ensure that manager and operator staff have redundant skills 
that allow them to work together in a crisis and avoid staff fatigue;
•	 Obtain approvals and insurance to operate and secure vessels 
in appropriate locations;
•	 Arrange for fast­track approval that will ensure the appointment 
of key recovery personnel (e.g., salvage teams and divers);
•	 Consider how to assign ferry staff to cleanup and travel demand 
management duties during any extended suspension of operation;
•	 Determine locations where new temporary ferry services may 
be required if critical infrastructure (i.e., road or rail tunnels) is 
destroyed, which shoreline locations have sufficient water depth 
and infrastructure for emergency ferry services, and locations of 
vulnerable populations who may need ferry services;
•	 Back up ticketing data off site for quick reestablishment of 
fare payment services; implement cashless fare payment systems to 
avoid staff overload from additional passengers; and deploy redun­
dant ticketing systems in case of lost power, mobile towers, or other 
facilities; and
•	 When recommencing operations, ensure logistics for key staff, 
including their travel to and from terminals.
concLusions
In agreement with previous research on disaster preparedness in the 
transport sector, the study findings highlight the need for preparation 
and emergency planning in advance of a disaster (11–13). Temporary 
ferry services can be deployed quickly if a fleet is effectively secured, 
FIGURE 3  East River Ferry terminal and vessel, 2012.
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the basic terminal infrastructure is resilient, and river navigation is 
safe. The East River Ferry’s success in alleviating the postdisaster 
transport chaos of New York City by recommencing operation within 
2 days of Hurricane Sandy clearly shows the value of ferries in a city’s 
transport mix. Ferries can reconnect vulnerable or isolated popula­
tions and can replace other modes where bridges, tunnels, or key net­
works are unavailable. And ferries can do both tasks rapidly if a ferry 
fleet exists in the area already. With minimal infrastructure require­
ments—no roads, rails, or tunnels—ferries can be reintroduced rap­
idly after a disaster. Ferry introduction during or after emergencies 
can be aided by significant advance planning, for example, by iden­
tifying the locations where ferries may safely berth, and by testing 
scenarios to determine how they may best be deployed if other key 
transport links are severed. Cities that take such steps will optimize 
their emergency response efforts.
How ferry systems handle emergencies depends entirely on context. 
The river environs in Brisbane and the destruction of much of its ter­
minal infrastructure put the ferries out of action for a modest period. 
Even then, the CityCats were running 4 weeks after the city’s greatest 
disaster ever. The steps that the city of Brisbane is taking to make 
terminals more resilient suggest that recovery after any future flood 
will be quicker and far less expensive. Operators elsewhere may avoid 
significant damage and improve their own recovery from flood or 
storm surge if they heed the lessons shared by their peers in Brisbane 
and New York City. Modest investments in more resilient ramps and 
pontoons are cost­effective in the long term through avoided damage.
Future research may consider improved technical designs for ferry 
terminals (including spud barges and pontoons as well as landing 
areas) to better withstand flooding. Research may assist with identify­
ing training needs for ferry operators to improve emergency response 
and in defining the current role and potential of ferries and other water­
craft in humanitarian logistics. Given the rapid spread of linear river 
ferry systems to cities in developed and developing countries, the need 
to understand these systems better and learn how to make them more 
efficient and effective, in both daily operations and special events, is 
increasingly important.
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